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January, 19671

NOTES

of those who were dependent on the testator in life. The charity would no longer
be encumbered by its traditional restrictions on inheritance. Instead, the stress
would be on general limitation of testamentary freedom; the charity would be
on a par with non-charitable strangers in order to protect the testator's family.
However, retention of the present statute with certain modifications would
seem to be the most likely alternative. The class of heirs allowed to challenge
charitable bequests should be reduced to those to whom the testator owes a duty
of support during his life. Attempts to evade the effect of the statute should be
sharply curtailed by the courts in order to carry out its more realistic scope of
protection and to prevent a pitfall for the unskilled. Unfortunately, under such
a revised statute the charity is still restricted in its ability to inherit, but such
modifications would limit these restrictions to fewer cases.
The modem goal of the mortmain statutes is to protect the family of the testator
against disinheritance. However, it is readily apparent that even the most stringent
of the proposed mortmain legislation does not adequately perform this function.
The testator's family could still be left without means of support if the testator
made Ins will prior to the prohibited period, or gave his property to non-charitable
beneficiaries. Adequate family protection legislation should guard against all disinheritance-not just gifts to charity.
Nancy Franzen*
Flexible Restraints on Testation, 69 HAv. L. REv. 277 (1955). See also Plager, The
Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. Cm. L. R. 681
(1966) for a very complete discussion of the frequency of disinheritance, which, of
course, has bearing on the most desirable remedy for it.
0
Member, Second Year Class.

WILLS: ADEMPTION BY EXTINCTION IN CALIFORNIA
The General Rule
A specific testamentary gift is a devise, bequest, or legacy of some certain
realty, specified article, or particular fund that is distinguished from the remainder of testators estate by the terms of his will.' Because of such testamentary
specification, a specific gift will be held to have been adeemed if the specific
subject matter devised or bequeathed is not part of the testators estate at the
time of his death and no provision is made in the will for its absence.2 Ademption of such a specific testamentary gift, as it is generally understood, is "the loss
of the [specific gift]
by the loss, transfer or termination of the testators
I AriNsoN, Wirms § 132, at 732, 737 (2d ed. 1953). Essentially the same defimtion is stated in CAL. ThoB. CoDE § 161(1): "(1) Specific. A legacy of a particular
thing, specified and distinguished from all others of the same kind belonging to the
testator, is specific
2See AT=NsoN; op. cit. supra note 1, at 732.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 18

interest therein before his death." If a specific gift is held to have been adeemed,
the gift fails and the devisee or legatee takes nothmg.4
The courts, in determining whether there was an ademption, utilize a two
step process. 5 First, the nature of the gift-whether specific, general, demonstrafive, or residuary-is determined. This requires a construction of the terms of
the will to discover which kind of gift testator intended at the time the will was
executed.6 Once it is determined that the gift was specific, 7 the court will ascertain whether it was adeemed by some subsequent change in status of the subject
matter of the gift. In deterining whether an adeinption has taken place, England
and a majority of American jurisdictions 8 follow the general rule set down by
Lord Chancellor Thurlow in Humphreys v. Humphreys:9
[Tihe only rule to be adhered to was to see whether the subject of the specific
bequest remained in specie at the time of the testator's death; for if it did not,
then there must be an end of the bequest; and . the idea of discussing what
were the particular motives and intention of the testator in each case in destroying the subject of the bequest would be productive of endless uncertainty and
confusion.10
Under this majority rule, unless the subject matter of the specific gift is part
of testator's estate at the time of Is death, an adeinption results.
3 6 PAGE, Wnas § 54.1, at 242 (3d ed. 1962).
4Id. § 54.5, at 248. Ademption by extinction should not be confused with ademption by satisfaction, which means the act of the testator in satisfying the gift to a legatee
or devisee during the lifetime of the testator by paying the legacy, turning over the
subject of the bequest, or otherwise giving the legatee his share of the estate. On ademption by satisfaction, see generally 6 PAGc, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 54.1-54.2, 54.21-54.37;
ArxxNsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 133.

5 The classic statement of the dual nature of ademption by extinction is found in
Ashburner v. MacGusre, 2 Bro. C.C. 108, 109, 29 Eng. Rep. 62, 63 (1786), where Lord
depended on
Chancellor Thurlow stated the fumdamental rule that "the claim
two questions.
was given as a specific legacy.
1. Whether the legacy
o is adeemed.
2. [W]hether the legacy
6ATxNsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 132, at 731-32 states: "The question of whether
a legacy is specific, demonstrative, general, or residuary depends upon the intention of
the testator as disclosed by the language of his entire will, the circumstances surrounding him, and certain rules of construction applied by the courts." See also 6 PAGE, op.
cit. supra note 3, § 48.1, at 2.
7 For interesting examples of how far the California courts have gone in finding

a bequest to be general or demonstrative, not specific, in order to avoid an ademption,
see Estate of Blackmun, 98 Cal. App. 2d 314, 220 P.2d 30 (1950); Estate of Cline, 67
Cal. App. 2d 800, 155 P.2d 390 (1945); Estate of Jones, 60 Cal. App. 2d 795, 141
P.2d 764"(1943).

s E.g., Alexander v. House, 133 Conn. 725, 54 A.2d 510 (1947); Moffatt v. Heon,
242 Mass. 201, 136 N.E. 123 (1922); Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197
(1927); Wyckoff v. Perrne, 37 N.J. Eq. 118 (1883); Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N.Y.
388, 63 N.E. 340 (1902); Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853); In re Barrows, 103 Vt.
501, 156 Aft. 408 (1931); Estate of Kdamba, 230 Wis. 246, 282 N.W 570 (1938). See
generally 6 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 54.15, at 266; ATrsNsoN, op. cit. supra note 1,

§ 134, at 742.
92 Cox. Ch. 184, 30 Eng. Rep. 85 (Ch. 1789).
10 Ibid.
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The Californi View
California has defined a specific legacy by statute;"I and, although the statute
does not mention intent, the Calif6rma courts are in accord with the general rule
that testator's intent governs whether a legacy is specific, demonstrative, or
general. 12 The California rule determining an ademption by extinction, however,
is not so clearly defined. The Probate Code merely says that "if such specific legacy
fails, resort can not be had to the other property of the testator."B As to what
causes failure of the gift such that an ademption results, the leading California
case of Estate of Goodfellowl 4 adopted a federal circuit court's 15 definition of
ademption saying:
Ademption of a specific legacy is the extinction or withdrawal of a legacy in
consequence of some act of the testator equivalent to its revocation, or clearly
indicative of an intention to revoke. The ademption is effected by the extinction
of the thing or fund bequeathed, or by a disposition of it subsequent to the wL,
from which an intention that the legacy should fail is presumed.j6
The California definition, then, involves an act of the testator which indicates
his intention to cancel the gift. This act must be an act of such extinctive or
dispositive character that it raises a presumption that testator intended the gift
to fail. Therefore, it appears that the Goodfellow court felt the intent of the
testator was to be sought, and that the court should not merely ask whether the
subject matter of the gift remained in specie as part of testator's estate at the
time of his death.
This conclusion is supported by Estate of Mason, decided by the California
Supreme Court in 1965.17 There testatrix executed a will specifically devising
her home and furnishings to her son. She was subsequently declared incompetent,
and the appointed guardian sold the home, applying the proceeds to her maintenance. The devisee sought to abate the residuary legatee's share of the estate
to make up for his loss, while the residuary legatee claimed the specific devise
had been adeemed. The court held that no ademption had been effected, saying,
inter alia: "A change in the form of property subject to a specific testamentary
gift will not effect an ademption in the absence of proof that testator intended
that the gift fail."'8 This reasoning was also applied in Estate of Holmes,1 9 decided the same year by the district court of appeal. There testator was found to
have sold his specifically devised realty while acting under the undue mfluence of
11 CA . PnoB. CODE § 161(1).
12
Estate of Buck, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 196 P.2d 769 (1948); Estate of Jepson, 181 Cal.
745, 186 Pac. 352 (1919); Estate of Moore, 135 Cal. App. 2d'122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955);
Estate of Loescher, 133 Cal. App. 2d 589, 284 P.2d 902 (1955); Estate of Blackmun,
98 Cal. App. 2d 314, 220 P.2d 30 (1950); Estate of Jones, 60 Cal. App. 2d 795, 141
P.2d 764 (1943).

13 CA.

PRoB. CODE § 161(1).

14 166 Cal. 409, 137 Pac. 12 (1913). The court held that a specific legacy of $5,000,
to be obtained from her father's estate, was adeemed when testatnx subsequently collected1 5and mingled the proceeds with her general estate.
Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1912) (dictum).
16 Estate of Goodfellow, 166 Cal. 409, 415, 137 Pac. 12, 15. (Emphasis added.)
17 62 Cal. 2d 213, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005.
18 Id. at 215, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 15, 397 P.2d at 1007. (Emphasis added.)
19233 Cal. App. 2d 464, 43 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1965).
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hIs housekeeper, the residuaiy legatee. The court held that the undue influence
made his dispositive act involuntary and awarded the proceeds from the sale to
the specific devisee. This case also recognized a trend in California to let the issue
of ademption turn upon the intent of the testator where possible20 and stated
that Mason "confirms that trend and adopts the rule that intent controls."2 1 As to
when tus intent is'to -be sought, the court said: "Some earlier cases left doubt
whether the intent sought was that expressed in the will or that existing at time
of disposition of the devised property.
In any event, Mason looks to intent at
22
the time of alienation, the view indicated in Stevens, Cooper and McLaughlin."
From Mason, then, it is apparent that some proof is necessary-not to show
that testator intended the gift to continue-but to show that he intended the
gift to fail. From Holmes it appears that the Califorma courts feel obligated to
go outside the terms of the will and determine this intent at the time of the dispositive or extinctive act., But neither case, nor any other California case, has
stated what, if any, criteria are to be used in this determination of intent. However, they all appear to consider the circumstances affecting the dispositive or
extinctive act.23 These circumstances should be categorized generally to provide
an objective standard which the courts can apply to the problem of determining
testators intent at the time the status of the subject matter of the specific gift
changes.
Suggested Criteria
The following categories are submitted as gmdelines to be used in this determination: (1) testator's role in the change-whether active or passive; (2) the
character of the change-whether substantial or merely formal; (3) disposition
of the proceeds, if any-whether traceable or not; (4) opportunity of testator
to change his will-whether a long or short time has elapsed between the change
and testators death; and (5) miscellaneous circumstances peculiar to the facts
of the particular case.
Testators Role in the Change of Status of the Specific Property
When testator-plays-an active role in the disposition or extinction of the subject matter of the gift,.,as where he-sells real-estate,2 4 transfers stocks or bonds,25
20 Id. at
2- Ibid.

468, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 695.

22 Ibzd. The cases cited by the court are Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965); Estate of Stevens, 27 Cal. 2d 108, 162 P.2d 918 (1945);
Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App. 2d 592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951); and Estate of McLaughin,97 Cal. App. 485, 275 Pac. 875 (1929).
23
In Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 488, 275 Pac. 875, 877 (1929), the
court said: "[Olrdinarily the purpose [of the testator] will appear by a construction of
the terms of the will in the light of the subsequent acts and conduct of the testator."
Accord, Estate of Moore, 135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955). See also Estate
of Stevens, 27 Cal. 2d 108, 162 P.2d 918 (1945).
2
4E.g., Estate of Benner, 155 Cal. 153, 99 Pac. 715 (1909); Estate of Sorensen, 46
Cal. App. 2d 35, 115 P.2d 24 (194f), Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 481, 275
Pac. 874 (1929) (not to be confused with Estate of McLaughlin, note 23, supra).
S5 E.g., Estate of Buck, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 196 P.2d 769 (1948).
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sells his automobile,2 6 or sues to collect a debt;2 7 it follows that he probably has
full knowledge of the legal effect of his act relative to the particular property.
However, where testator merely plays a passive role m the change in status of
the particular property, as where a bequest of an undistributed interest in X's
estate.is subsequently distributed to testator,28 a mortgage or other debt is paid,29
or bonds are redeemed by the obligor; s0 it does not follow as readily that testator
considered the legal effect such a transaction might have upon the specific gift.
The former situation-where testator is the primary cause of the change in
status-implies conscious and intentional choice on his part that the consequent
change in status should take place3 1 The latter-where the testator plays no
active role in the change-allows no such implication of choice. No conclusion
testator intended with reference to the specific gift can be clearly
as to what
2
deduced.
Characterof the Change in the Status of the Specific Property
If the change in status amounts to a substantial change in the character of
the property, as where real estate is sold,as or a car is disposed of,34 or stocks
and bonds are transferred;5 5 and nothing more is shown; an inference that testator
was intentionally eliminating the specific property from his estate seems reasonable. 8 Where, however, testator applies the proceeds to purchase similar
2
6
2

E.g., Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App. 2d 592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951).

E.g., Morgan v. Wolpert, 164 Ga. 462, 139 S.E. 15 (1927).
E.g., Estate of Babb, 200 Cal. 252, 252 Pac. 1039 (1927); Estate of Coodfellow,
166 Cal. 409, 137 Pac. 12 (1913); Estate of Cline, 67 Cal. App. 2d 800, 155 P.2d 390
(1945).
29
E.g., Estate of Jepson, 181 Cal. 745, 186 Pac. 352 (1919); Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485; 275 Pac. 875 (1929).
30 E.g., Estate of Jones, 60 Cal. App. 2d 795, 141 P.2d 764 (1943).
SiIn Estate of Sullivan, 128 Cal. App. 2d 144, 147, 274 P.2d 946, 948 (1954), it
was said: "[Testator] disposed of the property from the sale of which the legacies were
to be paid. From tins act oanses the presumption that he intended the legacies should
fail." In Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 37, 115 P.2d 241, 242 (1941), the
court stated: "ITihe,ademption was effected by the disposal of the property [sale by
testatrix],
by an act which prevented its passing by the will."
32
In Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 489-90, 275 Pac. 875, 877 (1929),
the court held: "The accepting of a deed of conveyance in consideration of the exact
funishes no evidence of the
indebtedness secured by a mortgage [the bequest]
where the testatrix retains the
intent of a testatrix to accomplish an ademption
property to the time of her death, and subsequently makes no change in the terms of
her will." Also, the court in Estate of Cline, 67 Cal. App. 2d 800, 806, 155 P.2d 390,
394 (1945), said: "[T]here is no showing that by any act or conduct of Ins after he
made his will and up to the time of Is death [testator] . intended to abolish the
gift to appellant." The latter case was almost entirely dictum, but it was approved in
7

28

Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 215, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15, 397 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1965).

aS E.g., Estate of Benner, 155 Cal. 153, 99 Pac. 715 (1909); Estate of Sullivan,
128 Cal. App. 2d 144, 274 P.2d 946 (1954); Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35,
115 P.2d 241 (1941); Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 481, 275 Pac. 874 (1929).
54 E.g., Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App. 2d 592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951).
358 E.g., Estate of Buck, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 196 P.2d 769 (1948).
6n Estate of Resler, 43 Cal. 2d 726, 736, 278 P.2d 1, 7 (1954), the court held:
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property,ar or merely alters his interest in existing property,38 or otherwise effects
a change merely in the form of the property, 8 9 not amounting to a change m
substance-it seems reasonable that he did not intend the gift to be extinguished;
and that by replacing or only altering the character of the specific property, that
he intended such gift would remain in force. 40
Disposition of the Proceeds Derved from the Specific Property
Where a substantial change in the status of the property takes place, and the
proceeds from the transaction are not traceable to a readily identifiable source;4 1
it is reasonable to infer that testator must have felt that extinguishing the gift was
more important than maintaining it or acquiring substitute property.42 Where,
however, the proceeds of the transaction changing the status of the propertyalthough the character of the specific property is entirely changed-are readily
traceable and have been maintained intact, it cannot be as easily said that abrogation of the gift was more important to testator than maintaining it in its new
form. The fact that testator kept the value of the gift intact,43 even though he
"[Alfter the will was made,
testator transferred his interest in the business [the
specific bequest]
. in exchange for [a promissory]
note. That sale divested the
testator of his interest in the business, and, in absence . of a contrary intent, it may
not be assumed that he intended to bequeath the proceeds of it in lieu of his interest."
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 73; Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 37, 115 P.2d 241,
242 (1941).
3
7E.g., Estate of Cooper, 107"Chl. App. 2d 592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951).
38
E.g., .Estate of Hale,, 170 "Cal. App. 2d 351, 338 P.2d 997 (1959); Estate of
Trainer, 161 Cal. App. 2d 353, 326 P.2d 520 (1958); Estate of Moore, 135 Cal. App.
2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (.95 ); Estate of.McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 275 Pac. 875
(1929).
39 E.g., Estate of Stevens, 27 Cal. 2d 108,162 P.2d 918 (1945).
40Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App. 2d 592, 596, 237 P.2d 699, 102 (1951), held
that "[T]he exchange of a certain property which has been specifically devised, for
other similar property, will not-constitute an ademption." See CAL. PNon. CoD. § 78;
Estate of Trainer, 161 Cal. App. 2d 353, 326 P.2d 520 (1958); Estate of Hale, 170 Cal.
App. 2d 351, 338 P.2d 997 (1959) (trust deed taken back in conveyance of specific
devise-no ademption).
41E.g., Estate of Coodfellow, 166 Cal. -409, 137 Pac. 12 (1913); Estate of Babb,
200 Cal. 252, 252 Pac. 1039.(1927); Estate of Sullivan, 128 Cal. App. 2id 144, 274 P.2d
946 (1954); Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 481, 275 Pac. 874 (1929).
42Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 481, 483, 275 Pac. 874, 874-75 (1929),
'held: "[Tihe entire interest
having been sold by her and conveyed to strangers,
subsequent to the execution of her will, and'the proceeds thereof having been mingled
with the general assets of the estate, the bequest must be deemed to have been
abrogated." Later, in Estate. of Resler, 43 Gal. 2d 726, 736, 278 P.2d 1, 7 (1954), the
court said: "[Iun [the] absence of a showing of a contrary intent it may not be assumed
that [testator]
. intended to bequeath the proceeds of [the sale]
in lieu of his
interest [previously bequeathed]."
43
E.g., Estate of Moore, 135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955); Estate of
McDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 43, 283 P.2d 271 (1955); Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal
App. 2d 592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951); Estate of Stevens, 27 Cal. 2d 108, 162 P.2d 918
(1945); Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 275 Pac. 875 (1929). But see Estate
of Peyton, 143 Cal. App. 2d 379, 299 P.2d 897 (1956) (check deposited a few days
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abolished its physical substance, should be persuasive that he did not intend to
abolish the benefit conferred on the legatee by the will.4
Testator's Opportunity To Change His Will
If testator has had a clear opportunity to change his will, as where a period of
many years has elapsed from the change in status,45 or where he has revised his
will by codicil as to other parts of his estate,40 it cannot easily be said that he
consciously intended to retain a benefit for the specific legatee. Where such a
clear opportunity for testator to change his will exists, and he does not, this fact
is persuasive that the change in status was done deliberately, or at least accomplished with the knowledge of the testator. 47 When, however, a very short-time
elapses between the change in status and testator's death, 48 or where no change
in his will is possible,49 or where a codicil is attached which republishes a will
purporting to leave property which has only been altered in form,5O no inference
can be drawn from the fact that the will is not changed. Where no such clear
opportunity exists to change the will, and he does something indicating hIs intent
before death); Estate-of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 115 P.2d 24 (1941) (check
uncashed at time of death).
44
Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 216, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15, 397 P.2d 1005,
when the specific
1007 (1965), held: "[A] specific testamentary gift is adeemed
property has been disposed of by the testator and cannot be traced to other property
or when the testator has placed the proceeds of such property m a
in the estate
" Accord, Estate of Packam, 232 Cal. App. 2d 847,
fund bequeathed to another
43 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1965). In Estate of Holmes, 233 Cal. App. 2d 464, 469, 43 Cal. Rptr.
693, 696 (1965), the court said: "Although ademption would result if the proceeds
that problem does not arise here. The
of the property sold could not be traced
" But see Estate of Benner,
proceeds are readily traceable to the bank account
155 Cal. 153, 99 Pac. 715 (1909) (sale of devsed realty, proceeds comprised practically
whole estate, held adeemed); Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 115 P.2d 24
(1941) (sale of devised realty, check uncashed at testators death, held adeemed).
45
E.g., Estate of Goodfellow, 166 Cal.-409, 137 Pac. 12 (1913); Estate of Moore,
135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955).
46 E.g., Dean v. Tusculun College, 195 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47
E.g., Estate of Sullivan, 128 Cal. App. 2d 144, 147, 274 P.2d 946, 948 (1954),
where it was said: "The will was drawn July 2, 1949. Testator died January 31, 1952.
In the meanwhile, he disposed of the property from the sale of which the legacies were
to be paid. From this act arises the presumption that he intended the legacies should
fail." But see Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 489-90, 275 Pac. 875, 877 (1929);
the court held: "The accepting of a deed of conveyance in consideration of the exact
indebtedness secured by a mortgage on the same premises, furnishes no evidence of the
intent of a testatrx to accomplish an ademption of a devise of the interest in the property represented by the mortgage, where the testatnx retains the property to the time
of her death, and subsequently makes no change in the terms of her will."
48
E.g., Estate of Holmes, 233 Cal. App. 2d 464, 43 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1965); Estate
of MacDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 43, 283 P.2d 271 (1955). But see Estate of Peyton,
143 Cal. App. 2d 379, 299 P.2d 897 (1956); Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d
35, 115 P.2d 24 (1941).
49
E.g., Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965);
Estate of Ehrenfels 241 A.C.A. 294, 50 Cal. Rptr. 358-(1966).
50 E.g., Gilmer v. Aldndge, 154 Md. 632, 141 At. 377 (1928).
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that the change in status have no effect, it cannot be clearly said that testator,
by his subsequent act has shown an intent to adeem. 51
Miscellaneous Circumstances and Circumstances Peculiar
to the Facts of the ParticularCase
In many cases courts either stress or include as part of an argument for or
against finding an ademption, minor circumstances which do not fit into the above
categories. Each circumstance apparently affects the court's determination whether
the specific gift has been adeemed; and together they indicate that the above
categories are the major circumstances, but are not all-inclusive. Among the
minor circumstances are: whether the proceeds become incorporated into another
legatee's specific gift or merely become part of the residuary estate;52 whether
testator has attempted to dispose of all his property, or has left part by a general
residuary clause;5 whether the will is holographic, indicating no legal advice
or awareness of the effect of the subsequent extinctive act, or whether drawn
by an attorney;5 4 whether the specific legatee will take rather than the intestate
heirs;5 5 whether the gift is made more valuable by the change,56 or less;57 whether
testator had actual knowledge of the change in status;58 and whether the taker
by force of the ademption is named in the will.59
Application of Criteria
Because of Mason and Holmes, the California rule appears to be that no
ademption will be found without proof that testator intended to destroy the
specific devise, bequest, or legacy; and this requires an examination of testators
purpose at the time the status of the property changes. To determine this intent
correctly, assuming that the will does not provide for an alternative distribution
in the case of an ademption, the court must look to the circumstances of the
dispositive or extinctive act. This in turn requires an evaluation of these circumstances, and a deterimation of their effect should be. controlling. It is during
this evaluation that the above-mentioned categories should prove helpful. For.
example, the two easiest cases would be:
(1) Testator's voluntary act causes an extinction of the subject of the specific
gift; the proceeds from such transaction are mingled with. the generar assets of
51 E.g., Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 216, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15, 397 P.2d 1005,
1007 (1965), where the court held that "the reasons for refusing to 'find an ademption
upon the guardian's sale are
the incompetent testator lacks intent to adeem .
and the opportunity to avoid the effect of an ademption by making a new will
See also Estate of Ehrenfels, 241 A.C.A. 294, 50 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1966).
52Estate of Babb, 200 Cal. 252, 252 Pac. 1039 (1927).
58 Estate of McLaughlin, 97 Cal. App. 485, 275 Pac. 875 (1929); Estate of Moore,
135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955).
5
4Estate of McLaughlin, supra note 53; Estate of Moore, supra note 53.
55
Estate of McLaughlin, supra note 53; Estate of Moore, supra note 53.
5
6Estate of McLaughlin, supra note 53.
5
7Estate of MacDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 43, 283 P.2d 271 (1955).
58 Ibd.
5

9Estate of Moore, I35 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939 (1955).
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his estate; and a long period of time elapses between the time testator disposes
of the property and the time of Ins death. With this set of circumstances it would
be relatively easy to infer that testator intended to adeem the specific gift.6o
(2) But, if testator plays only a passive role in the act that causes the status
of the property to be changed; and if this change is only one of form, the proceeds of the transaction being readily traceable; and testator has no opportunity
to change his will; it would be difficult to say that testator intended to adeem
the specific gift.O'
Although less clear, the same method of evaluation may be applied in those
cases where a combination of these circumstances are mconsistent. For example,
testatrix sells realty previously devised. She receives the proceeds in the form
of a check, which remains uncashed at the time of her death three weeks later,
and her will is holographic, indicating she was without legal advice. If the specific
devise is held adeemed, the proceeds will pass as intestate property2 in the
absence of a valid residuary clause. This case involves a voluntary act of the
testatrix and a change in substance; but there are readily traceable proceeds and
no clear opportunity to change her will. It also includes a lack of legal advice and
a possible resulting partial intestacy. None of these factors alone indicate clearly
whether testatrix intended to adeem the specific devise. Taken together, however,
it can be argued that she was probably not aware of the legal effect of her act
and did not desire that the proceeds should pass to possible strangers rather than
to her previously chosen beneficiary. Also, the fact that the proceeds were unspent
at death indicates no pressing need for money or desire to apply it to some other
purpose. Finally, from the fact that testatrix died soon after the sale, it can reasonably be inferred that she had given no thought to an alternative testamentary
scheme. These factors taken together are persuasive that the circumstances tending to show an intent to adeem: voluntary disposition of the devise and extinction of its sub]ect matter, should not be controlling. The circumstances taken as
a whole are in favor of an intent not to adeem; and under Masores requirement
of proof that testator intended the gift to fail, no ademption should be found
because of nsufficiency of proof.6s
60 For such a fact situation see Estate of Buck, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 196 P.2d 769
(194&Y. Testator owned 40,000 shares of stock in a tightly held corporation. He
bpqueathed a total of 30,000 shares to his six children and 5,000 shares to clainant.
Subsequently he made a gift of 10,000 shares to his wife, transferring these to her in
his lifetime. The court, after holding the bequests specific, held the clamiant's bequest
of 5,000 shares had been adeemed.
1For such a fact situation see Estate of MacDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 43, 283
P.2d 271 (1955). Testatrix bequeathed any car she might own at her death to her
mother; subsequently she wrecked the car, dying a few hours later. The court held
the insurance proceeds from the car went to the mother m lieu of the specific bequest.
62
These are the facts of Estate of Sorensen, 46 Cal. App. 2d 35, 115 P.2d 241
(1941).
6
3 The court held, however, that the specific gift had been adeemed. It is doubtful
that this result would be reached today. Compare Estate of Holmes, 233 Cal. App. 2d
464, 43 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1965), where the court held the unspent proceeds from the
sale passed to the specific devisee because the circumstances of the sale showed no
intent to adeem.

470

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Conclusion
Most California ademption cases can be approached m this way. The form
of analysis is not difficult of application and provides an objective approach to
the California courts' obligation to determine whether testator intended an ademption to be effected. It also allows the courts the opportunity to avoid both strict
rules of law and guesswork in their determination, thus providing flexibility when
needed to avoid a harsh result, as well as a basis for more uniform holdings.
Richard C. Smith*
*Member, Second Year Class.

